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SURROGATE GESTATOR: A NEW AND
HONORABLE PROFESSION
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, sex without reproduction has become common and
widely accepted, and more recently medical science has made it increas-
ingly possible to have reproduction without sex. The former is much more
enjoyable than the latter for most of us and, while it does entail some moral
and legal issues, is a great deal less complex than the latter.1 A major cause
of the complexity of the issues associated with noncoital reproduction is
that, while "science [tends to] look... forward to anticipate new and un-
foreseen possibilities, the law looks backward, drawing its support from pre-
cedent."2 Our society seems to first develop and perfect medical and
scientific techniques, and only later consult experts in ethics and law to
determine if we should be doing that which in fact we already are doing.
Meanwhile, we try to resolve disputes arising from new reproductive tech-
nologies by using "old legal codes of paternity, maternity, baby-selling,
adoption, and contracts."3
This Article proposes a new approach to an aspect of noncoital repro-
duction-"gestational surrogacy"-that is gaining rapidly in popularity
and seems to hold great promise for the future. Gestational surrogacy is an
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D. 1966,
John Marshall Law School.
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1. Alexander M. Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legal Challenges, 20 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 679, 686 (1987).
2. Warren A. Kaplan, Fetal Research Statutes, Procreative Rights, and the "New Biology":
Living in the Interstices of the Law, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 723, 723 (1987).
3. Laura R. Woliver, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Policy Concerns for Women,
8 POL. & LiFE Sci. 185, 185 (1990).
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arrangement whereby the sperm and ovum of a couple, who wish to raise a
genetically related child, is used to create an embryo through in vitro fertili-
zation.4 The embryo is then implanted in the uterus of another woman who
subsequently gives birth to the child. The child is then given to the genetic
parents to raise. Gestational surrogacy has the potential to benefit both the
creating genetic parents who will raise the child and the surrogate who will
bear and give birth to the child. To achieve the full potential of this unique
opportunity we must develop new ways of viewing and resolving the issues
and problems involved.
II. WHY SURROGACY?
The idea of "surrogate6 motherhood" dates back to at least the Old
Testament stories of the apparently infertile Sarah7 and Rachel,8 who in-
structed their husbands to impregnate their maid-servants so that they
might have children. In more recent years, the pregnancy of the surrogate
mother has been accomplished by artificial insemination, or in vitro fertili-
zation, rather than by physical intercourse. In any case, the objective is for
the surrogate to take the place of a woman who cannot conceive a child or
cannot carry it to a live birth.
Although many people are aware of surrogate motherhood, many of
them, unfortunately, know about it only because of a few highly publicized
contests between the surrogate mother and the parents who intended to
raise the child. In recent years, less than one percent of surrogate births
have created contests over custody of the child.9 However, it is these few
battles that produce headlines and come to public attention.1"
Approximately two to three million couples in the United States, consti-
tuting eight to ten percent of married couples with a wife of child-bearing
age, are infertile.11 Although some people think that infertility has greatly
4. "In vitro" means "outside the living body and in an artificial environment." WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 617 (10th ed. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). In this case, however, the gestator,
Anna Johnson, attempted to keep and raise the child as her own.
6. A surrogate is "one appointed to act in place of another;... one that serves as a substi-
tute." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1187 (10th ed. 1983).
7. Genesis 16:2.
8. Id. 30:3.
9. Barbara S. Parish, Test Tube on Trial: Let California Blaze the Trail to the Legitimation of
Surrogacy, 9 GLENDALE L. REv. 56, 56 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
11. Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered:A Proposed Regulatory Frame-
work for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 625, 631 (1991); Parish, supra
note 9, at 56.
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increased in recent decades, 1 2 it has actually remained fairly constant. 13
However, due to sociological and environmental factors, such as postpone-
ment of parenthood for financial and career reasons, pollution in the atmos-
phere, and disease, individuals are less fertile when they try to have children
after reaching thirty or forty. 14 Thus, the incidence of infertility among
couples who are trying to have children today is higher than in the past.
Through the years, adoption has been viewed as an acceptable alterna-
tive for many infertile couples. However, because of the widespread use of
contraceptives, availability of abortion, and growing willingness of single
mothers to keep their babies, the supply of desirable 5 children available for
adoption has dwindled greatly. 6 For most couples, adoption is "a long and
arduous process."' 7 The judge in the Baby M case "found that in 1984, two
million couples contended for the 58,000 children placed for adoption"' 8
and that the waiting period was three to seven years.19 Many couples seek a
better solution.
That better solution has sometimes involved the use of a surrogate
mother, and use of surrogacy seems likely to increase in the years ahead. It
is quite possible for a child born through a surrogacy arrangement to be in
the welcoming arms of his parents within a year of the beginning of the
process. Although surrogacy involves substantial expense, it may be less
costly than adoption,20 especially when the latter is expedited by the use of
the gray or black market.
Even more important, many couples are quite willing to invest more
time and money than that required for adoption in order to have a child
who is genetically related to one or both of them. This is clearly evidenced
by the great increase in infertility treatment, the widespread use of artificial
insemination and in vitro fertilization, and the growing interest in surrogate
12. Joan H. Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of
Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 865, 875-76 (1985).
13. Janna C. Merrick, Selling Reproductive Rights: Policy Issues in Surrogate Motherhood, 8
POL. & LIFE Sci. 161, 161-62 (1990).
14. Parish, supra note 9, at 56; Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adop-
tions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59, 61 (1987).
15. For most potential adoptive parents, "desirable" means a healthy Caucasian baby.
16. Christopher P. Litterio, Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilization, and Surrogate
Motherhood: Breeding Life and Legal Problems in the United States and Great Britain, 10 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 533, 537 (1986).
17. Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 4 (1986).
18. Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1793, 1802 (1988).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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birth arrangements.21 In our society there is a powerful and pervasive "de-
sire to reproduce [and] ...connect to future generations through one's
genes." 22
III. WHAT IS SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD?
Generally, most people use the phrase "surrogate mother" "to designate
a woman who gives up a child she has borne to be raised by another woman
and her husband, [the latter being] the child's biological father. ' 23 This
arrangement is often called "partial surrogacy," because the "surrogate" is
the genetic mother of the child, while the woman who will raise the child as
its mother has no genetic relationship to it. In its purest form, however,
surrogacy involves the creation of an embryo from the sperm and ovum of
the couple who intend to raise the child. This embryo is then implanted in
the womb of the surrogate, where it develops until birth. This arrangement
is often called "full surrogacy," since the surrogate has no genetic relation-
ship to the child, but simply provides a womb for the development of the
child.24
The remainder of this Article discusses only full surrogacy and the is-
sues and opportunities pertaining thereto. Although there are problems
and objections with any form of surrogacy, many do not apply to full surro-
gacy at all, and others apply to a much lesser degree. Moreover, full surro-
gacy has the potential to provide great opportunities and rewards to both
the rearing parents and the gestator.
For purposes of this Article, I will avoid using the word "mother" for
either of the women involved. Instead, I will refer to the couple who are the
genetic creators of the child as the "parents" and the woman who bears and
gives birth to the child as the "gestator." In so doing, I hope to avoid the
confusion that often surrounds the word "surrogate," and the emotional
and traditional connotations of the word "mother." I will refer to the en-
tire process as "gestational surrogacy."
21. John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent'? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 389 (1991).
22. Hollinger, supra note 12, at 874.
23. Capron, supra note 1, at 679 n.1.
24. Laurence E. Sweeney, "Chilling" the Procreational Choice: Frozen Embryos-Who Gets
What When the Donor Couple Divorce, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 367, 370 n.21 (1990); Sharon L.
Tiller, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrange-
ments, 72 IOWA L. REV. 415, 416 n.5 (1987).
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IV. POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
A. Parents
Many couples who are involuntarily childless are not infertile. They
are, in fact, capable of producing healthy ova and sperm. For some women,
pregnancy is difficult or dangerous because of some physical condition, such
as diabetes or high blood pressure.2" In other cases, a woman with ovaries
may have undergone a hysterectomy.26 A woman also may elect to use a
surrogate gestator rather than bear her own child simply for convenience,27
for reasons relating to her career, leisure, or lifestyle.28
B. Gestators
Women choose to be gestators for many reasons. Some women enjoy
being pregnant and like the feeling that comes from creating a new life.29
Others get great satisfaction from being able to help another couple have a
much-wanted child.3" Most women, however, including many of those in-
fluenced by the above reasons, are motivated by the desire for financial re-
ward. For some, this means being able to buy things, such as a second car,
a better house, or an education that they could not otherwise afford. For
those less economically privileged, it means an opportunity to be self-sup-
porting or to contribute to the basic budget of one's family. For women
who find it difficult to obtain employment that pays well, being a gestator
may be the ideal job, since it can be done in their "spare time at home with
little training. ' 31 A gestator can bear children for others in between and
after the births of her own children, "allowing [her] to stay at home to raise
[her own] children while still making money to support the family."'3 2
25. John L. Hill, The Case for Enforcement of the Surrogate Contract, 8 POL. & LIFE Sci.
147, 148 (1990). Another medical problem would be cancer of the uterus requiring radiation
treatment. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 1012 n.243 (1986).
26. Robertson, supra note 25, at 1012.
27. Katz, supra note 17, at 3.
28. Some women may wish "to avoid ... morning sickness, a bulky torso .... or the discom-
fort of childbirth." Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65
N.C. L. REv. 127, 132 (1986).
29. Jamie Levitt, Biology, Technology and Genealogy: A Proposed Uniform Surrogacy Legisla-
tion, 25 COLutM. J.L. & SOC. PROnS. 451, 461 (1992). Many women feel more content, more
attractive and feminine, and enjoy the extra attention they receive while pregnant. Stephen G.
York, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a Proposed Solution, 24 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 395, 399 (1991).
30. Levitt, supra note 29, at 461.
31. Ellen Goodman, The Business of Surrogacy, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1990, § 5, at 8.
32. Woliver, supra note 3, at 189.
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C. The Host Uterus Program
Gestational surrogacy is not revolutionary. The Division of Reproduc-
tive Endocrinology and Fertility at George Washington University Medical
Center started its "host uterus" program in the late 1980s, and eighty or
more such births have been reported in recent years.33 The next logical step
is to have the sponsors of host uterus programs assume responsibility for all
aspects of gestational surrogacy: matching parents and gestators, collecting
and paying all fees and compensation, providing medical facilities and bene-
fits to the gestators, and enforcing all provisions of the agreement among
the parties.34 Each gestator would become, at least during her pregnancy,
an employee of the host uterus program, subject to its rules and regulations,
and assured of full payment for performance of her duties. The parents, on
the other hand, would be clients of the host uterus program. Thus, they
would be able to rely on its past performance and its interest in future good
will and reputation. In this way, they are less likely to encounter a dispute
than if they dealt directly with the gestator.
There is every reason to believe that, over a period of time, the position
of gestator will be viewed as an honorable and desirable profession, which
gives many women the opportunity to earn money by providing a service
that society values. But before this will materialize, we must recognize the
objections that have been raised to surrogate motherhood, including gesta-
tional surrogacy. We must then demonstrate that these objections are ill-
founded and far outweighed by the benefits of a well-conceived host uterus
program.
V. OBJECTIONS AND THEIR REBUTTAL
A. Commercialization
The following article describes New York's ban on surrogate-parenting
for profit:
Albany, N.Y.-[July 23, 1992] Gov. Mario Cuomo signed a bill
Wednesday making New York-where an estimated 40 percent of
the nation's surrogate-parenting deals are arranged-the 18th state
to ban surrogate parenting for profit. The Legislature, pushed by an
unusual coalition that included the National Organization for Wo-
men and the New York State Catholic Conference, approved the
ban last month. It takes effect in one year. New Yorkers will still be
33. Levitt, supra note 29, at 459.
34. See infra part VII.
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allowed to act as surrogates for friends or relatives, but no contracts
or broker fees will be allowed.
"[S]urrogate parenting contracts of a commercial nature are void and
against public policy, and you cannot use the courts to enforce them," said
Helen Weinstein, a chief sponsor of the new legislation. 36 Moreover, Wein-
stein believes that "[s]urrogate parenting denigrates human life and turns
reproductive rights into something that you can buy and sell, and turns
children into commodities. '37
In response, Betsy Aigen, a clinical psychologist who became interested
in the issue after she discovered that she was infertile, said "the proposed
legislation would do more harm than good."38 According to Aigen, "Anti-
surrogacy bills don't prevent surrogacy, [but rather] leave [the] participants
without any protection."39 Aigen warns that "eliminating trained, account-
able professionals would lead to a proliferation of Baby M stories. '
Although most people apparently do not object, in principle, to surro-
gate motherhood, considerable opposition to paid surrogacy exists. It is,
however, difficult to find any logic in such a distinction. Perhaps the oppo-
sition to commercial surrogacy is derived from our "historical failure to
value [the] domestic work of mothers and housewives [, which contributes]
to the sense that gestation has no value[,] as a form of productive labor."41
But this overlooks the value of the services that the gestator provides to the
parents. She should be paid for her time, energy, physical discomfort, and
risk. If society is comfortable with allowing payment to doctors who aid in
the creation of children through in vitro fertilization, and with compensat-
ing those who contribute their sperm or ova, it certainly should be accepta-
ble to pay a gestator who contributes the temporary use of her womb.42
Why is using a body to produce a baby for someone else any different from
using a body to produce blood, sperm, ova, or any other regenerative sub-
stance for someone else's use?
Throughout American history, we have readily accepted the use of sur-
rogates to perform various roles of parenthood, such as wet nurse, govern-
35. Helen Weinstein, N. Y Outlaws Surrogate-Parenting Profits, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1992,
§ 1, at 11.
36. George E. Curry, New York State May Bar Mothers for Hire, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992,
§ 1, at 17.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id
41. Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 200 n.51 (1986).
42. Hollinger, supra note 12, at 893.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ess, day-care worker, and boarding school teacher. Prebirth surrogacy is
merely a modem extension of postbirth surrogacy, made possible by ad-
vances in science and medicine.43 No one has ever questioned that
postbirth surrogates should be paid for their services. Ours is a commercial
society, and most of our needs are satisfied by the use of commercial trans-
actions. Only a fair financial return will induce most potential gestators to
allow others to use their reproductive capacity.' Allowing surrogate moth-
erhood but prohibiting payment for the gestator's services would be compa-
rable to allowing doctors to perform abortions but prohibiting payment for
the doctors' services. Such a prohibition would "erect a major barrier to
access to the procedure."45 Bearing and giving birth to a child is perhaps
the finest and most valuable service a woman may provide. We should al-
low women to place an economic value on this service so that they may be
properly compensated if they wish to provide this service to others.46
B. Baby-Selling
All states prohibit the selling of children,47 and most have statutes
aimed at eliminating black market adoptions.48 Some people feel that these
statutes should apply to surrogacy arrangements. However, surrogate
motherhood did not exist when the baby-selling statutes were enacted.
Such legislation was established to protect a mother and child in an adop-
tion situation from falling prey to unscrupulous people operating in the
adoption black market. In most cases, the child involved was unplanned,
unwanted, and illegitimate, and the mother could not find an alternative to
giving up her baby to the highest bidder4 9 Generally, the adopting parents
were not biologically related to the child, their suitability as parents was not
usually investigated, and the child's best interests were rarely considered.5 0
In a gestational surrogate parenting arrangement, however, the agree-
ment to bear a child and give the child to its genetic parents is entered into
43. Harry D. Krause, Arificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185, 201
(1985).
44. Noel P. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147, 156.
45. Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 72, 76 (1988).
46. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) (holding that women are competent to
enter into binding contracts).
47. Merrick, supra note 13, at 163.
48. Katz, supra note 17, at 8-9 n.34.
49. Margaret D. Townsend, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a
Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 467, 478 (1982).
50. Karen M. Sly, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right to "Rent Her Womb"
for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 539, 550 (1982-83).
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before conception. The gestator is "not avoiding the consequences of an
unwanted pregnancy or fear of the financial burden of child rearing."51
Rather than being unwanted, the pregnancy is actively sought by a gestator
who knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any claim she may have to the
child before she becomes pregnant. Since the child will be reared by his
genetic parents, his best interests will be as well protected as if his birth had
resulted from normal coital conception and his genetic mother's
pregnancy.52
If the child is deemed to be, from conception, the child of his genetic
parents, there is no sale of the child. The gestator is not a parent, and thus
has no parental rights to relinquish. Payments to the gestator are for her
services in bearing and giving birth to the child and delivering the parents'
child to them. Moreover, the payments compensate her for her foregone
opportunities (employment, travel, birth of own child) and limitations on
activities (recreation, diet, sexual relations).53
The most that can be reasonably argued is that part of the gestator's
compensation is for her preconception relinquishment of any possible claim
to parental rights she might have under existing state law. For many years,
we have allowed the preconception sale of a man's possible parental rights
when he provides sperm for artificial insemination. If that is permissible, it
should not be objectionable to allow a gestator, who will have no genetic tie
to the child, to do the same. In divorce cases, for example, we routinely
allow a party to relinquish or limit his right to custody of a child in ex-
change for some other benefit in the overall divorce agreement.
C. Exploiting Poor Women
Some are concerned that most surrogates will be poor women who will
offer the use of their bodies to the well-to-do as an addition to their present
services of housekeeping and childrearing.54 First, there is no reason to
think that only poor women will want to become gestators. Despite the
long-standing view that women work only because of either stark economic
necessity or to earn some "pin money," many middle-class women work,
and would become gestators, to improve their standard of living.55 These
51. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986)
(emphasis omitted).
52. Levitt, supra note 29, at 475 & n.141.
53. Nichole M. Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements Under California
Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 116 n.115 (1991).
54. Robertson, supra note 25, at 1022.
55. For example, a woman may wish to buy or remodel a house, buy a car, pay for her own or
her children's education, or travel.
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women are certainly not being exploited any more than a man would be if
he took a second job for the same purpose.16
The exploitation argument is most often raised in connection with gesta-
tional surrogacy because the racial, genetic, and educational background
are no longer of much concern to the child's genetic parents. Some argue
that African-American and Hispanic women, who have fewer economic
choices than Caucasian women, will be hired as gestators because they will
accept lesser fees than Caucasian women.17 But the well-to-do are presently
employing these same women at very low wages for childcare and house-
work that takes them away from their own families. Why is it "exploita-
tion" to give these women the free choice of opting to earn money while
remaining at home, or perhaps earning more money while performing their
previous jobs and, at the same time, also serving as a gestator? Rather than
exploiting women, commercial surrogacy will liberate many women by al-
lowing them to engage in employment that is less distasteful and more re-
munerative than their present choices. 8
The other exploitation argument is that "[t]he lure of a very large sum
of money, perhaps larger than the woman could get any other way, may
lead her to commit herself to a decision that she may very deeply regret." 9
This problem is certainly not limited to surrogate motherhood. Many peo-
ple who commit themselves to long-term activities later wish they had not.
In many cases, they must complete their obligations because they have no
alternatives. Examples that readily come to mind are undertaking polar or
space expeditions, military combat, or an ocean voyage; performing a long
and delicate operation; or caring for children in the parents' absence. In
such instances, as with a surrogate gestator, the appeal of the offered re-
wards may fade as the task becomes more onerous and seemingly never-
ending. However, the task must be completed. Generally, we do not con-
sider it exploitive to expect people to perform difficult and dangerous as-
signments that they have willingly and knowingly undertaken.
D. Surrogacy Degrades Women
Some people, especially some feminists, believe that surrogate arrange-
ments "demean[ ] motherhood by reducing it to a type of farming; it rele-
56. Andrews, supra note 45, at 76.
57. Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational Surrogacy: An Argument
Against the Genetic Standard, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 525, 542-44 (1992).
58. David Orentlicher, Does Mother Know Best?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1114-15 (1989)
(reviewing MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988)).
59. Martha Field, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues, 25 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1589, 1590 (1992).
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gates [these] women.., to their biological function as reproducers, thus
degrading and objectifying them as 'mother machines.' "6 An additional
concern is that, because gestators will be valued in the marketplace by their
physical and psychological characteristics, some will have Saks Fifth Ave-
nue price tags while others will have K-Mart price tags.61 Some consider it
degrading that a woman's body can be rented for a price determined by her
reproductive capabilities, rather than for her intrinsic worth and
achievements.
However, most people readily accept the fact that, for many purposes,
their worth is determined by their personal characteristics, including physi-
cal, psychological, and other attributes. While many of us wish our per-
sonal characteristics were of a higher quality, we do not consider it
degrading to be judged on that basis. Perhaps the resistance to allowing
women's bodies to be treated as marketable objects is derived from the sex-
ism associated with Playboy bunnies and Miss America.62 But to let that
stand in the way of a woman's right to engage in gestational surrogacy is
paternalism at its worst. Women are not second-class citizens and do not
need to be protected from themselves. They are fully capable of making
their own decisions and accepting responsibility for them.
Far from being degrading, gestational surrogacy has the potential to
open up new opportunities for women that might not otherwise be economi-
cally possible. It may provide temporary employment to fulfill the short-
term needs of many women. For example, a young woman could finance a
year of school, save for the down-payment on a house, travel, or study
abroad.63 And for the mother-to-be who will raise the child, the potential
for opportunity and liberation is equally promising. Freed from the need to
take time out for bearing and giving birth to children, women will truly be
free to compete equally with men in business and professional life. Because
the role of gestator will be left to those who choose it, how can it be degrad-
ing for a woman to willingly bear and give birth to a child?
E. Surrogacy Will Reduce Demand for Adoption
A further objection to surrogate arrangements is that they will reduce
the demand for adoption at a time when there are many handicapped,
older, and non-Caucasian children in need of good adoptive homes.
60. Antoinette S. Lopez, Privacy and the Regulation of the New Reproductive Technologies: A
Decision-Making Approach, 22 FAM. L.Q. 173, 192 (1988).
61. Merrick, supra note 13, at 166.
62. Healy, supra note 53, at 115 n.112.
63. Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1763 n.17
(1988).
1993]
MARQUETE LAW REVIEW
Martha Field argues that "[i]t would be a real social harm for surrogacy to
substitute for adoption. '"64 While it is indeed difficult "to adopt the healthy,
white infants that many desire," the shortage of the latter "has resulted in
many children being adopted who once would have been hard to place."
65
While I do not question the social desirability of placing these "less de-
sirable" children in adoptive families, I do question whether the availability
of gestational surrogacy will have much effect on the adoption of hard-to-
place children. Relatively few couples will engage in gestational surrogacy,
but those who do need to be fairly affluent to afford the substantial costs
involved. If surrogacy is not available to these couples, they will most likely
enter the black or gray market to adopt a Caucasian baby. Hard-to-place
children will continue to be adopted primarily by couples who lack the
means to pursue other alternatives.66
Moreover, there is no reason to burden one small group of potential
parents with a special duty to adopt hard-to-place children. If we are deter-
mined to find homes for these children, we should require that all couples
who already have two genetically related children must adopt one hard-to-
place child before they may have another child by natural birth. Failure to
adopt before the arrival of a third child would subject the couple to a sub-
stantial fine. Perhaps my suggestion seems facetious, but it illustrates how
unfair it is to limit the opportunities of a group of people who did not cause
the social problem that we wish to cure.
It must also be noted that, to the extent that surrogate arrangements
result in a small decrease in the demand for adoption, it will make it possi-
ble for some eager adoptive parents to raise a child who would not other-
wise be available to them or whose availability would at least be long
delayed.
F Effect on Gestator's Own Children
Most host-uterus programs will require that a gestator have at least one
child of her own before entering into a gestational surrogacy arrangement.67
Because of this, some writers suggest that the gestator's own children will
experience feelings of abandonment, fear, and anxiety when they see their
mother go through nine months of pregnancy, and they then observe that
64. Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts-Gestational and Traditional. The Argument for
Nonenforcement, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8 (1991).
65. Id.
66. Cynthia A. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 107, 114-15 (1982).
67. See infra part VII.A.
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the baby does not join their family.6" The rather obvious solution to such a
problem is for the gestator to honestly and fully explain to her children
exactly what she is doing and why. It should be no different from the situa-
tion in which a woman provides day care for other people's children, or
serves as a temporary foster parent. Bearing and giving birth to another
couple's child is her "job." Because this is an honorable and useful service,
she should be quite comfortable explaining it to her children and expecting
them to be proud of her "work." If her children know from the beginning
that the baby-to-be is the child of the parents-to-be, and not a part of the
gestator's family, they will have no reason to fear that they will be aban-
doned or given away.
There is concern that the gestator's children will suffer embarrassment
when their peers learn of their mother's arrangement.69 Perhaps they will,
as is sometimes the case with children whose parents are members of reli-
gious sects or children whose parents advocate unpopular causes. We
surely do not want to let social intolerance and bigotry determine what
activities are permissible. It is the gestator's right to determine if her surro-
gacy arrangement is good for her family. Moreover, it is her responsibility
to help her children understand the importance of doing what they think is
right, even when that does not coincide with the views of others.70
G. Maternal Bonding
There is evidence that "a deep attachment or bond develops in the
course of the prenatal and postnatal relationship between mother and
child."7" Because of this, some people feel that a gestator will experience
mental anguish and depression when she "gives up" the baby. However,
although this is a common experience for women who give up their children
for adoption, there is little danger that this will occur with a gestational
surrogate. The latter knows before conception that the child is not hers,
and that her role in the child's life will end shortly after birth. The relation-
ship of gestator to fetus is analogous to that of many nannies and house-
keepers to their charges. They provide loving care for a time and often
develop close ties, but they always know that the child's tie to his parents is
paramount. The very low risk of unyielding "maternal bonding" on the
part of a gestator is evidenced by the fact that, while seventy-five percent of
biological mothers who give up a child for adoption later change their
68. Merrick, supra note 13, at 167.
69. Id
70. Andrews, supra note 45, at 78.
71. HMi, supra note 21, at 394-96 & nn.219-25.
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minds, only about one percent of surrogates have similar changes of heart.7 2
Furthermore, most surrogates who have a change of heart are the genetic
mother of the child, not just a genetically unrelated gestator.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SURROGATE ARRANGEMENTS
The force of law over surrogacy, in the form of statutory regulation,
should be employed only to: (1) provide a back-up for situations when the
parties directly involved have not made their own contractual arrange-
ments; (2) expressly authorize arrangements that may have been considered
illegal in the past;73 (3) relieve involved parties from parental or other re-
sponsibilities, when appropriate; and (4) provide for problems of inheri-
tance, custody, and financial support.
A statute should expressly require that the parties directly involved in
gestational surrogacy-the parents, the gestator, and the clinic or other
medical facility (host uterus program)-must enter into a complete and
binding agreement covering every foreseeable issue.74 The parties should be
free to make any provisions they wish unless those provisions are clearly
contrary to public policy. No provision should be deemed contrary to pub-
lic policy merely because it offends some people's beliefs. The agreement
should specifically state that advance provisions concerning surrogacy will
be legally binding and enforceable. As a result, all concerned will "know
with reasonable certainty" what will happen "if certain contingencies oc-
cur."75 Those who are involved in gestational surrogacy must be able to
rely on the agreements they made.76 And, the certainty that provisions
72. Andrews, supra note 45, at 74.
73. Some states impose criminal penalties. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(7) (West
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.020 (West 1988).
Other states merely make surrogacy contracts unenforceable. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-218 (1991).
74. See infra part VII.
75. Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We
Decide?, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1299, 1345 (1991).
76. Without enforceability, surrogacy contracts could easily become tools for blackmail. A
gestator might seek to extort additional payments from the parents by either threatening to abort
or keep the child. Krause, supra note 43, at 203. In connection with the widely publicized case of
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991), the intended father, Mark Calvert, stated
on ABC-TV's The Home Show, on February 11, 1993, that the gestator (Anna Johnson) had
offered to give up her claim to custody of the child for $50,000.
Also, as Judge Posner points out, surrogacy becomes less valuable to the gestator because she
loses part of her bargaining power. If surrogacy contracts are enforced, the gestator can com-
mand a higher fee because the outcome is more certain. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and
Economics of Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 22
(1989).
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made in advance will be binding and enforceable will "minimize the fre-
quency and expense of dispute resolution."77
Undoubtedly, one of the worst ways to start a child's life is with a cus-
tody contest.78 To avoid this undesirable possibility, statutory law should
make clear that the couple who genetically create the child and intend to
rear the child are the child's legal parents and are entitled to custody of the
child from the moment of birth. The statute should also clearly state that
the gestator is not the mother of the child and has no parental rights or
obligations in relation to the child.7 9 We have traditionally defined father-
hood by the genetic link. There is every reason to define motherhood in the
same way. If the right to custody of the child is clearly established and
legally enforceable, even the very small percentage of disputes that have
occurred will be largely eliminated.80
VII. PROVISIONS FOR THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The agreement among the parents (the couple who will genetically cre-
ate the child), the gestator, and the host uterus program should anticipate
and provide for as many future contingencies as possible. The agreement
must be binding on all involved parties and subject to modification only if
all parties agree. By now, we have had enough experience in this field to
foresee most of the issues and problems that may arise.
As stated in Part IV.C, the host uterus program will find and employ
gestators. Because each program will expect to provide services for many
years to come, it will have a strong incentive to set high standards and build
an excellent reputation. It is quite possible that, as the popularity of such
programs increases, some programs will have their own medical facilities to
assure quality and to achieve economies of scale.
A. Compensation of Gestators and Fees Charged Parents
In gestational surrogacy, the race and ethnicity of the gestator will be
irrelevant. The primary qualifications will be her present health and medi-
cal history, her willingness to conform her activities and lifestyle to the op-
timum conditions for pregnancy, and her willingness to relinquish custody
77. Alnen, supra note 75, at 1345.
78. Field, supra note 64, at 5.
79. This should eliminate any possible argument about "baby-buying or selling." Hill, supra
note 21, at 356-57.
80. Only one percent of surrogate birth mothers, most of whom have a genetic link to the
child, have attempted to rescind their agreement to relinquish the child. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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of the child immediately after birth. A well-run program will subject poten-
tial gestators to psychological and physical tests to determine their health
and emotional stability. It also seems wise to require that a gestator must
be living with at least one natural child of her own. This will assure that
she is physically capable of bearing and giving birth to a child. Moreover, it
will establish that she can accurately predict her own feelings about relin-
quishing the parents' child at birth and that she understands the medical
and emotional consequences of pregnancy and birth.81
The gestator's compensation will be determined by market forces-the
law of supply and demand. Over time, some gestators may be able to com-
mand a premium price because of their successful record in prior surrogate
births. First-timers will necessarily be judged largely by the results of the
program's testing. However, the rules of economics also dictate that the
opportunity costs of gestators will play a major role. Although a woman is
pregnant twenty-four hours a day for nine months, she may do many other
things during pregnancy. Women commonly work right up to the day of
delivery. In any case, many gestators will probably be women who have
low opportunity costs because their other earning opportunities are
limited.82
In addition to receiving compensation for opportunity costs, a gestator
should also be compensated for (1) any medical expenses not covered by the
program's own facilities or her own insurance; (2) her discomfort, pain, and
risk during pregnancy and birth; and (3) interruption of her sexual activ-
ity. 83 The program should also compensate the gestator, her family, or both
in the event of her death or disability during the period of employment.84
The host uterus program would recoup the gestator's compensation and
its other costs by charging fees to the parents who contract for its services.
Among these costs would be: (1) the expenses of any medical facilities and
personnel it maintains or contracts; (2) the expenses of locating and screen-
ing qualified gestators; (3) the fees of attorneys and other consultants; and
(4) the cost of any guarantees the program may give to provide institutional
or other care for children born with impairments.
8 5
81. Levitt, supra note 29, at 476-77.
82. J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 346-47 (1984).
83. If the gestator is married, which will usually be the case, her husband should be a party to
the agreement with the program and should be compensated for interference with his normal
consortium with his wife.
84. This likely could be provided by insurance, perhaps on a group basis.
85. This may also be covered by insurance. See infra part VII.B for further discussion of this
topic.
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Obviously, the fees charged to parents will be quite substantial, often
ranging from $30,000 to $50,000.6 While this will limit the potential de-
mand for gestational surrogacy, it will be partially offset by the parents'
opportunity cost savings. The genetic mother-to-be will be relieved of un-
dergoing pregnancy and childbirth herself. Thus, she can avoid taking time
out from her career and can avoid all the discomfort, inconvenience, and
risk of giving birth to her own child. For many, the net cost will be very
attractive, especially when compared to the present high cost and delay in
adopting a child who would not be genetically related. 7
B. The Agreement
A number of articles list and discuss the specific provisions that should
be included in the agreement among the parents, the gestator, and the host
uterus program."" Because it would serve no purpose to repeat all of that in
this Article, the instant discussion will- be limited to the key issues where
controversial questions will arise and where breaches of the agreement are
most likely to occur.
1. Activities of the Gestator
The agreement will usually provide that the gestator agrees to: (1) visit
the treating physician, chosen by the program, according to a specified
schedule; (2) follow the medical instructions of that physician, including
tests and screening; (3) not smoke tobacco products, drink alcohol, use ille-
gal drugs, or take any medication without the physician's consent; and (4)
submit to medical care or treatment prescribed by the physician. 9 The
agreement should affirmatively list the tests and procedures permitted90 or
list those to which the gestator need not submit. There must be a clear
understanding of this before conception because thereafter the interests of
the parents and the gestator will often conflict. The parents' interest will be
86. Merrick, supra note 13, at 163.
87. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323, 340 (1978).
88. See, e.g., Katie M. Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L.
263 (1982); James T. Flaherty, Enforcement of Surrogate Mother Contracts: Case Law, the Uni-
form Acts, and State and Federal Legislation, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 223 (1988); John J. Mandler,
Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73
GEo. L.J. 1283 (1985); David K. Martin, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies
Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601 (1984).
89. Thomas W. Mayo, Medical Decision Making During a Surrogacy Pregnancy, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 599, 620 (1988).
90. Such procedures might include amniocentesis, ultrasonography, drug therapy, blood
transfusions, fetal surgery, and Cesarean delivery. Id. at 627.
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almost exclusively in the child's well-being; they will be interested in the
gestator's health only to the extent that her health will affect the delivery of
a healthy child. While the gestator will want to deliver a healthy baby and
successfully complete her contract, she will not be eager to risk her own life
and health to reduce the chances of the child's death or disability.91 Once
there is a voluntary and knowing agreement on the part of the gestator, any
deviation from or refusal to submit to the prescribed regimen will be prop-
erly treated as a breach of contract.
In most cases, gestators will be willing to follow the requirements of the
agreement, especially if they hope for future employment as a gestator.
When a breach is threatened, or occurs, a court is unlikely to affirmatively
order the gestator to undergo a test or procedure that involves more than a
minimal invasion of her body.92 However, courts are usually much more
willing to issue prohibitory injunctions 93 and might well order the gestator
to stop smoking, drinking, or engaging in other activity that is potentially
harmful to the fetus. In addition to any monetary consequences provided
for in the contract or awarded as damages by a court, any subsequent viola-
tion of the injunction would subject the gestator to sanctions for contempt
of court.
2. Confidentiality
Because the gestator will be an employee of the program, and the par-
ents will be clients of the program, the gestator and parents need not know
each other's identity or ever meet. Parties may be matched by the program
according to their wishes on this subject. Some will be eager to share the
experience of pregnancy and birth and perhaps will have a continuing rela-
tionship thereafter. Others will want total or partial confidentiality and pri-
vacy. There is no right or wrong. The critical thing is to have a clear and
binding agreement, which cannot be modified later without the consent of
all parties.
3. Miscarriage or Stillbirth
In order to receive the full contractual compensation for her services,
the gestator will presumably have to bear and give birth to the child and
deliver the child to the parents. It is sometimes argued that the gestator
91. Id. at 627-28.
92. For example, ordering a cesarean delivery would arguably involve more than a minimal
invasion of the gestator's body.
93. E.g., Lumley v. Wagner, 42 ENG. REP. 687 (Ch. 1852) (enjoining opera singer who re-
fused to perform pursuant to her contract from singing elsewhere; court acknowledged that it
could not compel her to sing).
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should receive a partial or pro-rata payment in the event of miscarriage or
stillbirth. The rationale for this is that she has performed a service by car-
rying the fetus for that period of time. It is further argued that if no pay-
ment is made unless a live baby is delivered to the parents, the transaction is
tantamount to illegal baby-selling. 94 However, as stated earlier, baby-sell-
ing cannot occur in gestational surrogacy because the baby is at all times
the child of the parents. The gestator is being paid to bear and give birth to
the child, deliver the child to the parents, and waive any possible claim to
custody. Under this reasoning, the gestator might logically be denied any
compensation in the event of miscarriage or stillbirth, and the parents may
have no liability. The marketplace often compensates people only for pro-
ducing a desired result, regardless of the time and labor spent. Examples of
this include the farmer whose crop is destroyed by hail just before the har-
vest, the artist whose watercolor is washed out by a flood, and the Ph.D.
candidate whose almost-finished thesis is thrown out by a janitor. All have
expended labor over a long period of time, but will receive no reward. The
potential buyer will not have to pay anything for the fruits of their labor.
Of course, the program may contract to compensate a gestator in case of
miscarriage or stillbirth, especially if it wants to build good will and en-
hance its reputation as a quality operation. The program may either incor-
porate such costs into its overall fee structure or require the parents whose
baby is miscarried or stillborn to pay all or part of the normal fee.
4. Abortion: Permitted? Required?
In most agreements, the gestator will agree not to have an abortion un-
less her treating physician determines that it is necessary for her physical
well-being or that the child is impaired. She will also agree to have an
abortion in the event of either of these two contingencies. Of course, the
agreement may provide that the gestator is not required to abort, if that is
what the parties wish. It also seems wise to give the parents the right to
require an abortion if one of them dies or they become divorced.
While Roe v. Wade9 5 protects a woman's right to have an abortion, that
right may be voluntarily and knowingly waived, just as other constitutional
rights may be waived.96 Having an abortion when prohibited, or refusing to
94. Hill, supra note 25, at 158-59.
95. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2818 (1992).
96. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (right to be free from unreasonable
search); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to consult attorney before being ques-
tioned); State v. Jelks, 461 P.2d 473 (Ariz. 1969) (right to jury trial), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966
(1970).
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have one when required, will constitute a breach of contract. The gestator
may not change the rules any more than an astronaut may quit during a
mission or a surgeon may walk away during an operation. It is not uncom-
mon for a party to a contract to regret having entered into the agreement,
but the law still provides that contracts voluntarily entered into will be
enforced. 9
7
If the gestator decides to have an unauthorized abortion, the agreement
will probably provide that she will forfeit some or all of her compensation.
It would also seem proper for the parents to be relieved of their financial
obligation and perhaps to also receive some compensation from the pro-
gram for the delay and mental suffering that may ensue.98 Conversely, if
the parents and program want the gestator to have an abortion and she
refuses, the parents should be relieved of any financial and legal obligation
to the child. Custody of the child at birth should vest in either the gestator
or the program, as provided in the agreement. The agreement may also
provide for the child's placement for adoption, or for institutional care, if
necessary. The expenses involved, both present and future, will become
part of the program's overall budget. The expenses will be reflected in com-
pensation and penalties to the gestator and fees charged to satisfied parents.
If the parents, the program, or both determine that an abortion is desir-
able, and the gestator aborts as requested, she should certainly be entitled to
substantial compensation to cover her services for her time involved, her
lost opportunity costs, and her risk and discomfort. The fees charged to the
parents should logically cover this because the parents are exercising a right
to abort in the same way as if the female parent was herself pregnant and
carrying the fetus.
5. Death or Divorce of the Parents
If one parent dies before the child is born, the surviving parent will still
have full custody of the child, just as with the child of a coital conception
and normal birth. If both parents die before the child is born, the parents
should provide for the child's custody and care just as they would for any of
their other children. Of course, if the parents wish, the agreement could
provide for custody of the child to pass to the gestator, or to the program,
which would make the child available for adoption.
97. Hill, supra note 21, at 407.
98. A court is unlikely to award damages for breach of contract, since in purely monetary
terms "not having to raise a child is a financial benefit, not a loss, and intangible values of
parenthood are very difficulty to 'price.'" Natalie Loder Clark, New Wine in Old Skins: Using
Paternity-Suit Settlements to Facilitate Surrogate Motherhood, 25 J. FAM. L. 483, 494 (1986-87).
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The parents should also make a provision in the agreement in case they
are separated or divorced during the pregnancy. They may prefer an abor-
tion in the early months of pregnancy. Further along, the likely options are
that one parent will take custody of the child and relieve the other parent of
all responsibility or that custody will pass to the gestator or the program, as
in the case of death of the parents.
6. After Birth of the Child
The agreement should provide that the gestator and her husband, if any,
agree that they have no parental or custodial rights or obligations to the
child and that the parents will be entitled to immediate physical custody of
the child upon birth.99 The agreement should provide that either the par-
ents or the gestator will be entitled to specific performance, "that is, the
right to have the court order and enforce the delivery of the child [by the
gestator] to the... [p]arents."1 The situation is analogous to commis-
sioning a work of art. While the artist cannot be forced to create the work,
"once it is completed" it belongs to the commissioning party, and the artist
"cannot refuse to deliver it... merely because he wants to keep it. 101
7. If Parents Refuse to Accept the Child
If a healthy child is born, but for some reason the parents refuse to
accept custody, they should certainly be required to pay all fees provided
for in the agreement and other expenses that are incurred until someone
else assumes custody of the child. As in the case of death or divorce of the
parents, the agreement could provide for custody to pass to the gestator or
to the program so that the child may be placed for adoption. There is no
reason to force a healthy child on unwilling parents when others would be
very happy to raise the child.
If the child is impaired in some way, however, the situation is more
difficult. If the impairment is genetic or otherwise not attributable to the
gestator, custody should remain in the parents, just as it would with a child
born naturally to the female parent. As with a natural child, they would
have full legal and financial responsibility for the child. If appropriate, they
would also have to arrange for institutional care.
On the other hand, if the child's impairment results from actions of the
gestator, such as smoking, drinking, or failing to conform to the medical
99. Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L.Q. 123, 130 (1988).
100. d at 133.
101. Lori A. DeMond, The Ongoing Uncertainty of Surrogacy, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 685, 689
n.15 (reviewing FIELD, supra note 58).
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regimen, an instinctive reaction might be that she should be legally and
financially responsible for the child. However, this is not a wise solution.
The gestator has made it clear from the beginning that she does not want or
intend to raise the child even if the child is healthy. Furthermore, she is
unlikely to be in an economic position to provide for an impaired child.
The agreement could certainly provide that the parents assume the risk of
gestator-caused impairments and will accept custody and responsibility in
any case. However, that might create a very resentful atmosphere in which
the child would be raised. It might be best in this situation to provide for
custody to pass to the program, to seek adoption of the child, or to provide
institutional care. Any costs involved would be borne by the program as
part of its overall cost of doing business.
The parents should be allowed to renounce custody of the child only if
the gestator-caused impairment is "serious." The agreement should at-
tempt to define "serious." If either the seriousness of the impairment or its
cause is disputed, the agreement should provide for the issue to be decided
by a medical arbitration panel.
VIII. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. If There Is No Surrogacy Agreement
Even though a statute may require that no surrogacy arrangements may
be undertaken without a written agreement among the parents, gestator,
and host uterus program,1"2 people will violate the law. Thus, it will be
necessary to determine the custody of the child and financial responsibility
for the child when the parties themselves cannot agree. As suggested in
Part VI, a statute should provide that the parents are the legal parents of
the child and are entitled to custody from the moment of his birth."0 3 The
statute should also state that the gestator is not the mother of the child" 4
and has no parental rights or obligations relating to the child. These simple
statutory provisions will eliminate almost all of the disputes that might
otherwise occur. Because the parents will be indisputably entitled to cus-
tody of the child, a court should not hesitate to order the gestator to deliver
102. See supra part VI.
103. See Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376-79 (Ct. App. 1991), affid sub nor.
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
104. The presumption that the mother of a child "was the one from whose womb the child
came" has been so strong that the law has never felt it necessary to define the word "mother."
Stumpf, supra note 41, at 187 & n.1.
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the child to the parents, just as would be the case in a divorce or other child
custody proceeding in which a court orders someone to deliver a child to
the person(s) having a right of custody.
B. Statutory Provisions Needed to Support a Surrogacy Agreement
1. Inheritance
Probate law generally permits a person conceived before but born after a
parent's death to inherit by will or intestacy."15 Inheritance by a posthu-
mous child born as a result of gestational surrogacy should provoke no
more societal objection than inheritance by a child conceived coitally and
given birth by his genetic mother.
2. Relief from Parental Responsibility
Just as the law imposes no obligation of financial support on a sperm or
egg donor, 10 6 a gestator who makes her womb available to produce a child
for others to raise should be relieved of any financial obligation to the child.
This may be accomplished by so providing in the surrogacy agreement and
by enacting statutes that make such agreements legally binding and enforce-
able. While this will leave a gestator who does not have a formal agreement
exposed to possible financial liability, it is consistent with the strong public
policy requiring formal surrogacy agreements to reduce or eliminate
disputes. 107
3. Confidentiality
Just as in cases of adoption, the parties will usually want confidentiality
in the surrogacy arrangements to protect the child from learning about his
origin from someone other than his parents. The parents should be able to
control "the time and manner in which their child learns of the circum-
stances of [his] birth," when the child is deemed "ready to understand and
benefit from this information."' 018 By the same token, while most gestators
will not try or be able to hide their pregnancy and the fact that they are
serving as gestators, many will want to be sure that they cannot be linked in
105. See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6150(c) (West 1991).
106. See, eg., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973).
107. See supra part VI.
108. Pamela Smith, Regulating Confidentiality of Surrogacy Records: Lessons from the Adop-
tion Experience, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 65, 95 (1992-93).
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any way to the parents and the child after the birth.10 9 Statutory law
should recognize the general acceptance of a right to privacy in reproduc-
tive matters. The law should provide that all records and documents relat-
ing to a surrogacy arrangement shall be confidential and that only the
parents shall be listed on the birth certificate.
IX. CONCLUSION
The fact that an occasional gestator may regret having to surrender the
child to the parents is not a valid reason to ban the practice or to make such
agreements unenforceable. People often make agreements that they later
regret-marriage, divorce, relinquishment of children for adoption-but so-
ciety continues to permit such practices and enforce such agreements." 0
The law should recognize as legal parents the couple who really want to
have and raise a child because they are as likely to perform well the task of
parenting as any other couple whose child was born in the usual way.
Banning surrogacy will not end the practice; it will simply force it un-
derground, as was the case with abortion in many states prior to Roe v.
Wade."' Gestational surrogacy may be beneficial to all parties involved
and to society. Some states will almost surely allow surrogacy arrange-
ments. Thus, banning the practice in other states will be largely futile be-
cause potential surrogate parents will usually have the means to travel to
and make arrangements in another state."12
Society not only allows women to bear and give birth to children with-
out compensation, it lauds and honors them for doing so. Why should we
deny women the opportunity to earn fair compensation for voluntarily pro-
ducing children for others? Is cleaning houses and offices, providing child
day care, clerking, and waitressing more honorable than bearing and giving
birth to children? Do we prefer to keep women economically dependent
when they could be earning substantial sums doing something that they
want and prefer to do over the other choices available to them? How can it
logically be argued that using one's body to clean bathrooms for pay is
morally permissible, but using one's body to produce a child for others for
pay is not?113
109. Id. at 97.
110. Merrick, supra note 13, at 166.
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2818 (1992).
112. Book Note, Selling One's Birth-Rights, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1074, 1076 n.11 (1989) (re-
viewing FIELD, supra note 58).
113. Hill, supra note 21, at 411.
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The benefit of gestational surrogacy to the parents is clear and largely
undisputed. The benefit to the gestator should be just as clear. We should
allow gestational surrogacy to become an accepted and honored profession.

